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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, Appellant Garritsen seeks reversal of that part 
of the lower Court's decision as it effects him. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April of 1980 Respondent Gene Gray, pursuant to a certain 
agreement between himself and Defendant David Foster, advanced the latter the 
sum of $10,000.00 in exchange for a promise to issue Foster one-half of certain 
stock in a future corporation, (R-138), subsequently entitled Traders Exchange, 
Inc. Said stock was not issued as agreed. From about September 1, 1981 through 
November 27, 1982 Appellant Adrian Garritsen was an alleged employee/agent of 
Respondent Gray. The terms and conditions of said employment/agency according 
to Appellant, were that Appellant was to receive ten percent of all accounts 
he collected for Respondent and in addition, fifty percent of all amounts re-
ceived as a result of Appellant's efforts in marketing and selling certain pro-
ducts for Respondent (R-241). During said period Appellant testified he effected 
alleged collections in excess of $50,000.00 and sold products in excess of 
$25,000.00 (R-251). Contrary to said agreement, Appellant was not sufficiently 
compensated having received no more than $1,000.00 (R-246). In January of 1982 
Respondent Gray executed and signed a written agency agreement appointing Appel-
lant to represent him in executing an exchange of stock in Traders Inc. for the 
conveyance of a certain duplex then owned by Defendant David Foster, and direct-
ing an assignment of title upon closing to Wall Investments, (Exhibit 2-D). Pur-
suant thereto, on the 10th day of February 1982, Respondent Gray executed and 
signed a letter of agreement assigning all interest in Traders Inc. to Defendant 
Foster, and in addition tendered to Foster a stock certificate in Grayco 
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Manufacturing Inc. representing same to have a book value of $15,000.00, (Ex-
hibit 5-P). This transaction was predicated upon the parties understanding that 
Foster had $35,000.00 in equity in said duplex, and purported to be a complete 
release, accord and satisfaction between Defendant Foster and Respondent Gray. 
Thereafter, Respondent Gray requested Appellant to use his expertise and best 
efforts to secure certain mining claims, (R-224 - 227). Subsequent thereto 
Appellant located ten claims in Davis County and secured same in the name of Re-
spondent at his request, (R-255). On November 26, 1982 both Respondent Gray 
and Appellant executed and signed a written agreement which, inter alia, ac-
knowledged full satisfaction and receipt of said claims and released Appellant 
from any prior obligations between them. Said document purports to be, and was 
intended to be a "full and final settlement," (Exhibit 3-D). At trial Mr. Gray 
testified Appellant was indeed instructed to secure mining claims in his behalf, 
but testified Appellant had switched the claims, (R-49), but his testimony was 
inconsistent with the documentation and he contradcited himself several times 
regarding acceptance of same. Mr. Garritsen explained that there were two dif-
ferent sets of mining claims which he was looking into for Mr. Gray, (R-225), 
and further, that they were seperate and distinct and Gray was well aware of 
the difference, (R-225 - 227). The first claim was known as the Bulkely claim 
and was available for much more money than Mr. Gray could afford, (R-226). 
Having been made aware of this Gray instructed Garritsen to obtain other mining 
property, referred to as the Gold Ridge claims, (R-227), and (R-233). Garritsen 
further testified that at all times he was working for Mr. Gray and that he in 
fact secured said claims for Gray and put them in his name so that Mr. Gray 
could put them into a corporation with Mr. Tom Adams, (R-234). Further, 
Garritsen thestified that Gray knew that certain assessment work and road im-
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provements had to be made or the claims would revert and become worthless, 
(R-226). In fact, said claims were indeed put in Mr. Gray's name, (Exhibit 
14-P and 3-D). At no time was Garritsen authorized, instructed or under a 
duty to perform the assessment work, (R-229), and in addition, Mr. Gray was 
aware that he was obligated to do so. Garritsen testified that he spent ap-
proximately $20,000.oo in securing said claims for Gray not counting his 
personal labor, which he valued at about $1,500.00, (R-259). He also indi-
cated that the value of the 10 claims when they were acquired was about 
$50,000.00, (R-275). The evidence showed that those claims are now worthless 
because Gray failed to perform the assessment work, yet not withstanding the 
trial Court held that "if that mining claim is worth $20,000.00 that you found, 
or more, as you claim, then you are back where you started," (R-297), after 
awarding Garritsen the claims and Judgment against him in favor of Gray for that 
amount. In its findings on the record the Court did not address Mr. Garritsen"s 
counterclaim against Gray for past employment, (R-295 - 298) however, in the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment prepared by Mr. Dodd, attorney 
for Gray, (R-119 - 127) the Court no caused said counterclaim for the reason 
said "evidence was evenly balanced and therefore Garritsen had failed to 
carry his burden." The record is replete with affirmations of employment/ 
agency, testimony as to the terms and conditions thereof and damages with reas-
onable certainty. The only controverting evidence was the testimony of Gray, 
who said "He's (Garritsen) never worked for me in 20 years." Yet Gray's very 
next statement, he said, "I told him I'd give him ten percent of anything he 
could collect or 25 percent of anything he could sell." (R-285). It is note-
worthy that Gray kept all records in his possession and they were unavailable 
to Garritsen, (R-255). 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND AN ACCORD AND SAT-
ISFACTION, OR RELEASE BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT OR A 
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL. 
At trial the Court admitted Defendant's Exhibit 3-D (R-187) 
which is entitled a "Letter of Agreement," dated November 26, 1982 which 
Gene Gray acknowledged signing. Said document is also signed by Appellant. 
Although the document speaks for itself, it recites acknowledgement of re-
ceipt as and for consideration of the mining claims, describes same, in-
corporates Quit Claim deed thereto, and releases in full any obligation 
of Traders Exchange, Inc., Dave Foster, Adrian Garritsen regarding any prior 
investment therewith. It also recites an unqualified acceptance of the min-
ing claims described as the Gold Ridge Group, as full and final settlement. 
It describes 10 claims and acknowledges their filing in Gray's name. The 
Exhibit also denotes the receipt of the file and specifies what it indicated. 
There were no objections raised at trial regarding the authentic-
ity of same or the validity thereof. Further, it is the original copy. It 
appears from its face to be the final embodiment of the parties last agree-
ment. 
The document itself states it is intended to be a release in 
full, and even further, as a full and final settlement. 
This Court in a recent case, Hargan v. Industrial Design Corp., 
657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982), speaking through Justice Stewart, stated: 
A release is a type of contract and may generally be 
enforced or rescinded on the same grounds as other contracts. 
E.g., Coulter, Inc. v_. Allen, Wyo., 624 P.2d 1199, 1203 (1981); 
Westfall v. Motors Insurance Corp., 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96, 
98 (1962). The law favors the amicable, good faith settlement 
of claims, Woods v. Gamache, 14 Wash.App. 685, 544 P.2d 144 (1975), 
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and the encouragement and preservation of such settlements 
"constitute strong arguments for enforcing releases," Witt 
v. Watkins, Alaska, 579 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1978). Generally, 
^(wjhere an affirmative defense is stated, such as a valid 
release, which would defeat the cause of action, it is the 
duty of the court to grant a judgment based thereon." 
Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 369, 275 P.2d 170, 
171 (19541, 
In the case at bar, as in the above case, Mr. Gray indirectly 
raised an issue of duress. He testified that he neyer read anything be-
fore signing but merely trusted others and that "I donft like to read or 
write," (R-194). In response to questioning by the trial Court Gray test-
ified he had a 12th grade education and could read and write. Appellant 
testified that Gray had him type the documents because Gray didn't know 
how to type, (R-202). There was no evidence adduced at trial that Gray 
was under duress as defined by this Court at p. 783 in the above case 
wherein it was stated: 
(1969). In Fox v. Piercy, supra, we defined duress as "any 
wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim in 
such fear as to compel him to act against his will." 119 
Utah at 373, 227, P.2d at 766. We reaffirmed this definition 
in Heqlar Ranch, Inc. v> Stillman, Utah, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 
(1980), and we follow it in this case, not as a rigid rule 
based on precise elements that must be satisfied in eyery case, 
but as a general definition to be applied flexibly to the dis-
tinct facts of each case. 
Nor was there any persuasive evidence that he didn't know what 
what he was signing, in his own words, "he trusted people." It is note-
worthy in this regard that Garritsen was working for Gray and routinely 
typed such documents. 
The facts of this case certainly demonstrate a sophisticated 
course of conduct in business affairs by Mr. Gray contrary to any such 
contention. Additionally he admitted signing the document. 
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Alternatively, the aforementioned exhibit can be viewed as a 
novation, or substituted contract, or an accord and satisfaction. As this 
Court observed in Bradshaw v. Burningham 671 P.2d 196 (Utah 1983); when 
a-dressing the issue specified at p. 198: 
The dispositive issue is whether the parties1 compromise 
agreement was a binding modification of their original contract 
or an executory accord. This distinction is important because 
of the different contractual rights available to the parties 
under each analysis. "Where . . . a modification is agreed 
upon, the terms thereof govern the rights and obligations of 
the parties under the contract, and any pre-modification con-
tractual rights which conflict with the terms of the contract 
as modified must be deemed waived or excused." Rapp v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., Utah, 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 
(1980) (citations omitted). 
If, therefore, the compromise agreement was an amend-
ment to the original contract, it will, in conjunction with 
those terms of the original contract it does not contradict, 
create a substitute contract and thereby extinguish any 
rights under the original contract now defined by the amend-
ment. See generally 15A Am.Jur.2d Compromise and Settlement 
Subsection 3, 36 U976). 
In this case Mr. Gray gave up the right to proceed against the 
other parties in consideration of his receiving the mining claims he re-
quested (R-227). The terms of the agreement do not necessarily contradict 
those of his original agreement with Appellant, nor those of Foster when 
considering the stock transfer to Foster (albeit fraudulent) and the funds 
retained by Appellant to secure the claims. 
It was recognized in the Bradshaw Case, supra, that a novation 
"extinguishes any rightis under the original contract . . . " Therefore 
said agreement shculd have precluded and barred the instant action with re-
spect to Appellant. Or, alternatively operate as a waiver of any right Gray 
theretofore had against Appellant and estonp h^ 'm from bringing said actions 
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as a matter of law. see: Sugarhouse Finance Co. v^ . Anderson 610 P.2d 
1369 (Utah) (1980). 
Arguably if the document is construed as an executing accord, 
satisfaction would be in Appellant's forebearance to sue. see: Christenson 
v.. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900 (Utah 1979); Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 
560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977); Phillips Petroleum Company v. Hart, 480 P.2d 
131 (Utah 1971). 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE DAMAGES TO 
PLAINTIFF FROM APPELLANT AND IN NOT FINDING FOR APPELLANT 
ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM. 
After hearing this matter the trial Court attempted by its 
Judgment to place the parties back to their original positions, (R-160). 
In so doing, the Court gave Judgment to Gray for $25,000.00 against Appellant, 
and gave Appellant the mining claims. Testimony adduced at trial from Ap-
pellant Garritsen regarding the value of said claims was not contested. 
Garritsen testified that at the time he gave them to Gray they 
were worth about $50,000.00. Said opinion was later stricken as being based 
upon improper opinion and heresay, (R-251). He further testified that the 
cost of procuring the claims for Gray was approximately $20,000.00, not 
counting his time which he valued at $1,500.00, (R-239, 240). Evidence was 
adduced that the claims were secured for Gray, at his request, (R-227), placed 
in Gray's name as owner, (Exhibit 14-P), and that Gray knew that the claims 
required annual assessment work and participation in the improvement of a 
road, (R-229). Appellant neyer had the right, duty, obligation or opportun-
ity to complete such work, nor was he aware that he should, (R-230). 
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Gray, the owner of the claims failed to perform the required 
work on subject claims and they reverted to Bulkleys thereby rendering 
them worthless and without value at time of trial. 
On rendering its findings the Court indicated, after giving 
Gray Judgment against Garritsen for $20,000,00 (later changed to $25,000,00) 
that: "Mr. Garritsen, if that mining claim is worth $20,000.00 that you 
found, or more, as you claim, then you are back where you started," (R-397), 
and gave Garritsen all right, title and interest in the claims. 
Clearly the Court descerned that the claims still had value, not 
withstanding Gray's failure to complete the assessment work. Such an award 
obviously rewards Gray for his failure to maintain said claims at the dir-
ect expense of Garritsen. 
This Court has consistently held that damage awards must result 
from justice and reason, and not be unrealistic or unreasonable. First 
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J . Feedyards, 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); and 
"that the proceedings at trial were regular and proper and that the judgment 
was supported by competent and sufficient evidence," Bevan v. J.H. Construction 
Co. Inc., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983). Morover, in the Bevan case this Court 
went on to state at p. 444
 oc . . 
"... the general rule of damages which arms the trial 
court with the discretion to place the litigants as nearly as 
possible in the positiongthey would have enjoyed had the con-
tract not been breached. Furthermore, the subject damages 
arose fairly and reasonbaly from the breach of contract, and 
they may reasonably be supposed to have been within the con- » 
tempiation of the parties at the time they made the contract, 
and when adequately proven, said damages clearly fall within 
the purview of this Court's decision in Wagner v. Anderson . . ." 
In this case the affect of the damage award id to charge the 
Appellant $25,000.00 for merely doing what he was told to do by Mr. Gray, 
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and further unjustly enriching Gray for defaulting on his mining claims. 
Such an award in this case appears arbitrary and capricious, also see 
Cox Corporation v. Duggen, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah 1978). 
Appellant further submits the trial Court erred in not awarding 
him damages from Gray as a result of his employment. Even Mr. Gray ad-
mitted Appellant worked for him on a percentage basis predicated on collect-
ions and sales, (R-241). There exists conflict in the records as to whether 
the percent of sales to be paid Appellant was 50 percent (according to Ap-
pellant) or 25 percent (according to Gray). There was no dispute that Ap-
pellant was to receive 10 percent of the accounts receivable he collected. 
Appellant testified that he sold approximately $25,000.00 worth 
of goods and effected collection of approximately $50,000.00 for Mr. Gray, 
(R-251), in some detail. Gray generally denied this but failed to produce 
the records kept in his possession. 
The trial Court did not rule on this issue from the bench but 
completely ignored said issue (as raised by Appellant's counter claim) un-
til it signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment submitted 
by Plaintiff's counsel. 
Appellant contends the evidence regarding same preponderated in 
his favor and requests this Court to remand the matter for determination of 
damages and appropriate instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this 
Court for an Order reversing the trial Court's Judgment awarding Gene Gray 
$25,000.00 from Appellant, returning any such interest in said mining claims 
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to Gray, and an Order remanding that part of the case regarding the 
alleged employment claim by Appellant for a determination of damages 
with instructions. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 1984. 
'BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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